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THE NEGOTIATIONS ALTERNATIVE IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
JOHN T. DUNLOPt
I. INTRODUCTION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEGOTIATED
RESOLUTION
In Western societies there have been two approved arrangements
over the past century or two for resolving conflicting interests among
groups or organizations and their constituent members: the market-
place and government regulatory mechanisms established by the
political process. Markets in various institutional forms' bring to-
gether buyers and sellers without visible hand, to set prices of goods,
services, and various factors of production, including land and capital
assets. Markets provide the terms of exchange and thus resolve,
largely impersonally, disputes between potential buyers and sellers
over the countless features of transactions. Adam Smith stated early
in the Wealth of Nations more than two hundred years ago:
Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which
you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this
manner that we obtain from one another the far greater
part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to
their own interest.2
In addition to providing markets with legal status, the political
process has established government institutions, from courts to ad-
ministrative tribunals, to resolve many other conflicts and differences
of interests and to restrain methods of conflict. Also, the political
process has established and nurtured the "public household"3 or pub-
" Lamont University Professor of Economics, Harvard University. University
of California at Berkley, A.B., 1935; Ph.D., 1939.
1. See J.T. Dunlop, Labor Organzaton, Markets, and Economic Vitahzation, in
STRATEGIES FOR PRODUCTIVITY, INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 11-20 (1984)
(symposium sponsored by Japan Productivity Center).
2. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 14 (1937) (discussing the principle which creates the division of labor).
3. D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITAIISM 220-27 (1976).
Bell defines the "public household," as it is expressed in the government budget, as
"the management of state revenues and expenditures." Id. at 221. This concept
stands in juxtaposition to the concept of "domestic household," the goods "not val-
(1421)
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lic sector that complements, competes with and alters the private
market economy.
It is not this article's purpose to recount or explain the develop-
ment of markets or the growth of the "public household," including
regulatory institutions, in Western societies or the United States.4
Rather, the starting point is to note that the received ideas and insti-
tutions present to resolve conflicting interests consist of both markets
and governmental regulation.
There is abundant evidence that the American community since
the Great Depression places less reliance on markets to achieve social
purposes, including the resolution of conflicting interests, despite the
deregulation movement of the past decade. 5 In international trade,
for example, the doctrinaire support for free trade and free markets
for international commerce has been supplemented or replaced by a
complex network of reciprocal and bilateral agreements negotiated in
various forums as reflected in the arrangements for sugar, coffee, tin,
wheat, textiles and apparel, steel and other manufactured goods,
maritime cargos and airplane fares, not to mention the migration of
people across national boundary lines. In the labor market, the pres-
ence of collective bargaining, minimum wage regulation, health and
safety standards, and pension and nondiscrimination requirements
emphasizes the extent to which reliance on the market has been qual-
ified. The regulations of the SEC, Federal Reserve System, Comp-
troller of the Currency and the housing finance agencies, fair housing
rules, and the Internal Revenue Code, among others, constrain capi-
tal flows and money markets. The complex of regulations affecting
specific product markets, from public utilities through consumer and
producer goods, including agricultural products, has greatly ex-
panded, constricting buyers and sellers and changing the nature of
these markets. Moreover, wage and price controls, or some form of
incomes policy, were in effect for twenty-two out of the forty-four
years that followed 1940.
ued . . . because they are not exchanged in the market," such as a housewife's serv-
ices, and "market economy," valuing goods by the prices used in the exchange of
money. Id. at 220. The idea of "public household" stresses the use of the govern-
ment's budget to distribute its assets to various sectors of the society. Id. at 226-27.
4. See A. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLU-
TION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); C. LINDLOOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS, THE
WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977); C.L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE
OF PRIVATE INTERESTS (1977).
5. Dunlop, The Limits of Legal Compulszon, in ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE REGULA-
TION 184-91 (R. Gordon ed. 1980). See also M.L. WEIDENBAUM, THE FUTURE OF
BUSINESS REGULATION: PRIVATE ACTION AND PUBLIC DEMAND (1979) (discussing
methods by which the business system best serve the public).
1422 [Vol. 29: p. 1421
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The costs of the complex of regulatory mechanisms, including
the distortion of decisions, financial outlays, litigation, delays and
greater uncertainty, have come to be increasingly recognized as a
heavy burden which complicates the resolution of conflicting inter-
ests. 6 The uneconomic consequences of some regulations have helped
to cause the rediscovery of the market in the past decade and to ad-
vance deregulation, as in developments affecting airlines, trucking
and communications.' The deregulation movement may still ex-
pand, although it is difficult to see deregulation growing faster than
the political propensity to regulate. The main thrust of the past gen-
eration must clearly be characterized as a movement away from reli-
ance upon the market.
Negotiations and negotiation processes appear to be on the as-
cendancy as compared to markets; in recent years, they have been
increasing even when compared to public regulations. It is not un-
common, for instance, for private corporate suits to be settled by di-
rect negotiations between the companies, or with the government, as
in the instance of a telecommunication antitrust case after more than
twelve years.8 The major disputes involving the price and supply of
uranium between Westinghouse and certain utilities have been set-
tled by direct negotiations and the withdrawal of court suits.9 The
device of plea bargaining on economic questions likewise is illustra-
tive of the general distrust of pure regulation and public agency deci-
sion and the tendency to resort to negotiations to limit uncertainty, to
speed resolution, and to assure greater attention to features of a settle-
ment that are of special concern to each party. Contestants often
achieve a more satisfactory and less risky settlement by direct negotia-
tions, or negotiations with the staff of a public agency, than would be
likely were the proceedings to run their full litigious course.
6. See, e.g., Arthur Anderson & Co., Cost of Government Regulations Study for Business
Roundtable (March 1979) (a study of the direct incremental costs incurred by 48 com-
panies in complying with the regulations of six federal agencies in 1977) (available at
University of Pennsylvan library); E.F. Denison, Effects of Selected Changes in the Institu-
tional and Human Environment upon Output per Unit of Input, SURV. CURRENT Bus., Jan.
1978, at 21-44 (explaining the costs of pollution abatement, employee safety pro-
grams, and crime).
7. See D. MARTIN & W. SCHWARTZ, DEREGULATING AMERICAN INDUSTRY
(1977) (comparing advantages and disadvantages of deregulation).
8. See Telecommunications Regulation Today and Tomorrow (E.M. Noam ed. 1983)
(discussing the 1982 consent agreement in which AT&T agreed to divest itself of the
Bell Operating Companies after the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
brought suit against it).
9. For a discussion of the facts surrounding this occurrence, see Westinghouse
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A variety of specialized mediation and arbitration devices also
have been developing in recent years to facilitate agreement-making
and to reduce litigation and formal court processes in fields outside of
the industrial relations arena, which has used such methods for many
years and where the institutional arrangements are well established. 10
Thus, malpractice suits, home or product warranty controversies,
price or product differences among owners, contractors and architects
in construction, or differences between manufacturers and converters
in textiles and apparel, or some equal employment opportunity con-
troversies are new areas in which disputes have been submitted to
mediation or arbitration under voluntary arrangements developed
and administered by the American Arbitration Association. A
number of courts have experimented with special mediators, includ-
ing the Bronx Housing Court in disputes between landlords and ten-
ants, and in some courts in divorce cases." A number of
organizations have sprung up, such as Resolve, to encourage the set-
tlement of complex controversies between environmentalists and busi-
nesses by using direct negotiations and mediation.' 2 In all these cases,
procedures that are faster, less expensive and more subject to the in-
terests of the contending parties are replacing more formal and legal-
istic determinations. 13 It can be expected that these methods of
dispute resolution will spread and be more extensively utilized.
Negotiations have not only extended into the resolution of indi-
vidual cases and disputes; they are also utilized to resolve controver-
sies over public regulations and rule making,' 4 and indeed, in the
accommodation of differences over the legislation itself. The proce-
dures used to enact the Arab boycott legislation, the 1979 Trade Lib-
10. See M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 24-30 (1965) (discussing the
American Arbitration Association and how arbitration protects victims injured by
uninsured motorists); G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION 93-109 (2d ed. 1983) (arbitration in a dispute between an architect and a
home owner).
11. See Kraut, Domestic Relations Advocacy-Is There a Better Alternatve?, 29 VILL.
L. REV. 1379 (1984) (outlining the special role of the mediator in family dispute
proceedings in Chester County, Pa.).
12. See G. Cormick & L. Patten, Environmental Mediation: Defining the Pro-
cess Through Experience (Feb. 1977) (paper prepared for the American Association
for the Advance of Science, Symposium on Environmental Mediation Cases, Denver,
Colorado; the authors are associated with the Office of Environmental Mediation,
University of Washington).
13. See generally L.S. BACOW, BARGAINING FOR JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH
(1980). For example, Bacow notes that the GM-UAW and the steel industries have
provided for more stringent health and safety arrangements than the standards set by
OSHA. Id. at 86-87.
14. Harter, Dispute Resolution and Administrative Law., The Hstory, Needs, and Future
of a Complex Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1393 (1984).
1424 [Vol. 29: p. 1421
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eralization Act and the 1983 Social Security amendments, are
illustrative of the successful resort to negotiations procedures prior to
and outside the established process. In Massachusetts, the legislation
reforming the administration of public employee pensions, including
disability pensions, and creating the Public Employee Retirement
Administration was negotiated and mediated among various private
and governmental interests, including legislators, before enactment.' 5
One needs to be careful about the meaning of the statement that
negotiations are an alternative to or replacement for markets and
governmental determinations. It is easy to see that there may have
been a change in form or appearance, but the reality is more com-
plex. As with wage and price controls or collective bargaining, mar-
ket forces are not entirely displaced or replaced. Sooner or later, they
continue to operate, limit and shape, to some degree, the decisions
made through the new institutions. It is erroneous to assert either
that the new institutions make no difference, or that the decisions are
entirely different since the market or the regulations have been al-
tered to a negotiations form. Rather, the reality is that both old mar-
ket forces and new ones generated by the new institutions operate
through the new institutions, yielding more or less different results, to
be assessed in each situation.
Collective bargaining, for instance, does change the performance
of labor markets in many ways not appreciated by econometric stud-
ies. The tendency of collective agreements in many industries to be
set for three-year terms, or differences between the parties in pure
bargaining skills and power, or institutional interests in fringe benefits
or union security may be expected to result in somewhat different
terms and conditions of employment over time than would arise
through markets or under governmental dictation. The quality of
management and its policies as well as the characteristics of the labor
force are altered. But it would be simplistic to hold that market con-
siderations have been entirely displaced or eliminated. The substitu-
tion in form, from market to a negotiations form, has complex results
that differ significantly from the market results.
The penetration of negotiations into the arena of governmental
determinations, similarly, is not merely a change in institutional
form. The costs and time of settlement are likely to be less than pro-
tracted litigation. The opportunity to influence more directly the
outcome and to secure attention to issues of most vital concern is
often greater. These factors are likely to yield different results
15. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 7, §§ 49-50 (West Supp. 1984).
14251983-841
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through negotiations than through litigation or other formal
processes. It must be remembered, though, that in the course of nego-
tiations, the possibility of reverting to a court, to an administrative
agency or to legislative bodies is likely to be a continuing influence,
and the emerging precedents of litigation are likely to influence rela-
tive positions and bargaining tactics. With regard to negotiations on
some issues subject to regulatory decisions, such as employment dis-
crimination or protected activity cases, agreements or settlements are
subject to attack and to displacement in the very tribunals that nego-
tiations are intended to circumvent. It cannot be denied, however,
that negotiating a settlement with one or more adversaries, or with a
governmental administrative agency or in a court is a different pro-
cess with somewhat different results than a commitment to litigation
and formal processes.
The field of industrial policy has come to be an area of intense
ideological debate, including the role of negotiations and tripartite
committees in establishing and administering policies relating to eco-
nomic growth and industrial configuration. Business Week, in an edi-
torial on the strategy for rebuilding the economy, urges "[t]he leaders
of the various economic and social groups that compose U[nited]
S[tates] society to agree on a program for reindustrialization and pres-
ent that program to Washington."' 16 The AFL-CIO has repeatedly
proposed a tripartite National Reindustrialization Board "to carry
forward a rational national industrial policy.' 7 The Wall Streel Jour-
nal takes a different editorial position:
The only industrial policy we need is one that offers the
maximum possibility for individual decision makers to ap-
ply their initiative and imagination, take their risks and
reap their rewards when their judgments are correct. As a
group they will be right far more often than government
bureaucrats not subject to the disciplines and incentives of
the market. i8
16. A Strategyfor Rebuilding the Economy, Bus. WEEK, June 30, 1980, at 146. This
editorial recognizes the necessity of reindustrializing the United States and proposes
a five step method to redo the manufacturing sector of the economy. Id. These five
steps include: 1) agreement on a program of reindustrialization between the leaders
of different sectors of the economy, 2) tax cuts for investments and subsidies or tax
preferences for research and development spending, 3) a different type of federal
budget, 4) redirection of investments away from housing loans and toward research
and expert activities, and 5) promotion of exports. Id.
17. Jobs.- The Agenda For Recovery, THE AFL-CIO AMERICAN FEDERALIST, Jan.
8, 1983, at 5, 8, reprinted in AFL-CIO NEWS, Jan. 8, 1983.
18. Nohb Nonstarters, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1982, at 34, col. 1. This editorial dis-
cussed a new industrial policy which would favor winning or "sunrise" industries
1426 [Vol. 29: p. 1421
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These introductory observations have been to call attention to
the reality of the growing importance of negotiations in resolving real
or potential conflicting interest among groups in our society. Negoti-
ations have been making inroads on both markets and governmental
mechanisms. These changes are more complex than the apparent
changes in form. The expansion of negotiations brings with it grow-
ing controversy over the independent consequences of negotiations.
The study of markets and, more recently, the study of regulation, are
both well established in the disciplines of economics and law. The
negotiations process deserves to be much better and more widely
understood.
II. APPROACHES TO NEGOTIATIONS
There are a variety of approaches to explicate the negotiations
process. A considerable amount of literature utilizes formal models
seeking to explain bargaining generally and collective bargaining ne-
gotiations in particular. 19 At one time I developed a model of bar-
gaining power (with Benjamin Higgins) based upon different degrees
of competition in related product and labor markets and the "pure"
bargaining power of negotiators to determine a wage rate.20
There are at least two major difficulties with the applicability of
abstract models of negotiations. The first is that they are typically
simplified to a single issue, such as money, or they assume that other
issues are translatable into money on some stable trade-off, effectively
creating a single issue. The second difficulty arises from the usual
presumption that the negotiators constitute monolithic entities. They
are portrayed as having no significant internal differences among the
constituent members of the negotiating organizations and no differ-
ences between these members and their negotiator. Also, in these ab-
stract models any internal differences which are used are entirely
constant throughout the negotiations. In my experience, these sim-
with tax breaks, loan guarantees and other subsidies, while not doing the same for
losing or "sunset" industries. Id. The editorial expresses skepticism about the ability
of government technocrats to predict which industries will be winners and which
losers and instead favors a more market oriented industrial policy. Id.
19. See W.N. ATHERTON, THEORY OF UNION BARGAINING GOALS 3-30 (1973);
J. PEN, THE WAGE RATE UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1'. S. Preston trans.
1959); I. STAHL, BARGAINING THEORY (1972); C.M. STEVENS, STRATEGY AND COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATION (1963); Korman & Klapper, Game Theoy's War-
time Connections and the Study of Industrial Conflict, INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV., Oct. 1978,
at 24-39.
20. Dunlop & Higgens, "Bargaining Power" and Market Structures, J. POL. ECON.,
Feb. 1942, at 1-26 (this model utilized the concepts of supply and demand of labor,
indifference functions of enterprises and degrees of monopoly).
1983-841 1427
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plifcations, essential to analytical rigor, are too abstract to be very
helpful for providing much insight into the class of negotiations
which are of central concern to me.
Another approach to explicate negotiations is through the use of
experimental or simulated bargaining games. 2' In some instances a
class is divided into groups to represent the negotiating parties, initial
positions are defined for each, and rules of play are specified. The
process can generate substantial interest and apparent involvement of
the participants.
There has been some effort to use econometric methods to mea-
sure aspects of arbitration or collective bargaining. Public sector bar-
gaining has been used most often in view of the availability of data. 22
The results appear to me to be unimpressive; situations are always
changing in some respects, and these studies do not appear to center
on fundamentals.
There is an approach to negotiations that constitutes an almost
verbatim account of the exchanges from the earliest stages of negotia-
tions to the achievement of a settlement. 23 In recent years more con-
densed case studies of negotiations have been developed for courses in
schools of business, law and public policy. 24
A somewhat different approach is developed in this article: to
limit the types of negotiations considered and then to outline a
number of key principles that are central to an understanding of the
negotiations process. These principles grow out of reflecting on expe-
rience; they seek to blend analysis and art forms.
The types of negotiations considered in this article have at least
three characteristics that eliminate some negotiations from our con-
21. See H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982) (setting
forth several game methods involving games against specified players, games not in-
volving any interaction with any player, and games of deception). See also DeNisi &
Dworkin, Final OrArbitration and the Naive Negotiator, INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV., Oct.
1981, at 78-87. This article analyzes a game in which undergraduate students played
the role of labor and management. Id. at 78-79. It concludes that negotiators try
harder to reach their own settlement and feel more positively about their opponents
when they fully appreciate the final offer procedure. Id. at 86.
22. See Butler & Ehrenberg, Estimating the Narcotic Efct of Pub/ic Sector Impasse
Procedures, INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV., Oct. 1981, at 3-20.
23. See, e.g., A. DOUGLAS, INDUSTRIAL PEACEMAKING (1962) (describing events
at the negotiating table and beyond, and providing an update on the mediation pro-
ceedings between the Atlas Recording Machine Company and Local 89 at the OPQ
International Union); E. PETERS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN LABOR NEGOTIATIONS
(1955) (using examples and case materials drawn from the author's experience as a
California labor conciliator to analyze the nature of industrial conflict).
24. See J.A. HENDERSON, CREATIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (J.J. Healy ed.
1965); B.M. SELEKMAN, S.K. SELEKMAN & S.H. FULLER, PROBLEMS IN LABOR RE-
LATIONS (1950).
1428 [Vol. 29: p. 1421
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cern in the universe of all negotiations. First, parties or organizations
expect to continue to be engaged and to interact over a future period.
Thus, the direct sale/purchase of a house between individuals who
are unlikely to have any interaction in the future ever again or a
transaction by a visitor to a garage sale are a species of negotiations
excluded from these principles. In the negotiations under considera-
tion in this article, events during negotiations, in the agreement-mak-
ing process, or in the breakdown of negotiationS, are likely to be
significant to the performance of the parties following negotiations.
Second, the negotiators represent organizations or groups within
which there are important differences in preferences among the con-
stituent members. These relative preferences for bargaining objec-
tives may even shift during the course of negotiations, particularly
when the negotiations are protracted. The parties to our negotiations
are not monolithic. Third, the negotiators are concerned with more
than a single issue, or with one that can be decomposed into more
than one subissue. Thus, whenever money is an issue, there is the
issue of effective dates of any change in money. Compensation typi-
cally has a variety of dimensions. While one issue may be more signif-
icant to one party, as compared to others, I have yet to meet a real
single issue dispute, recognizing that issues typically are decomposed
into a variety of dimensions, or components.
The framework for analysis of negotiations outlined in the next
section may provide some insight into these excluded classes of negoti-
ations, but that is not the present primary purpose.
Labor-management negotiations in the United States are char-
acterized by the three inclusions defined above, although few private
negotiations are so precisely specified by public policy. The labor or-
ganization is certified by law as the exclusive representative of the
employees in a precisely defined job territory.25 The management is
clearly identified by law. The subjects over which the parties are or
are not required to bargain are also defined by law. The obligation to
bargain in good faith 26 has been defined by statute and case law in
great detail. The labor organization has the obligation to represent
all employees in the bargaining unit fairly and without discrimina-
tion 27 including discrimination against any minority group of em-
ployees confronting a majority of employees. Negotiations are to
begin a specified number of days before the expiration of the old
agreement. Some methods of conflict in negotiations, for example,
25. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
26. Id. § 158(d).
27. Id. § 158(b).
14291983-841
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relating to a picket, a boycott or violence, are permitted by law while
others are prohibited. 2
III. FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE NEGOTIATIONS
The central purpose of this article is to assist those who observe a
negotiation through the press, second-hand accounts, or report of iso-
lated events of negotiations to understand better direct negotiations
and the role of associated mediation.
No outsider can ever fully participate in an ongoing negotiation
or a mediation process. This framework and statement of principles
is designed to facilitate a keener intellectual appreciation of what is
happening.29 Despite a spate of recent volumes that advertise that
one can learn to "negotiate agreement without giving in" or "get the
best out of bargaining," I am inclined to believe that the art of negoti-
ations can only be learned by experience, and often hard experience.
A framework for analysis may, however, provide a perspective on
what happens in negotiation and reduce the learning time or, per-
haps, the pain of experience.
The framework presented below is not highly abstract or elegant.
It does, however, reflect a first approximation of experience and anal-
ysis of the roles of various negotiating parties in diverse settings.
A. Internal Agreement
Each group or organization that is party to negotiations to seek
an agreement has diverse internal interests. Therefore, an internal
consensus or formal approval by each party is required to permit the
consummation of a negotiated agreement. Thus, in the instance of
two parties, it takes three agreements to achieve one agreement: an
agreement within each party as well as one across the table. In the
instance of three parties, it takes four agreements to achieve one
agreement. This simple proposition is a fundamental to agreement-
making.
The parties to negotiations, among continuing groups or organi-
28. See, e.g., id. § 158(b). Subsection (b)(4)(ii)(B) of this section is intended to
prohibit secondary picketing by a union involved in a dispute with a primary em-
ployer, where the picketing forces a secondary employer to choose between keeping
its customers or continuing to deal with the target of the worker's dissatisfaction.
Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 947 F.2d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 1981). However, under
§ 158(b)(4), informational picketing at a common work situs, such as picketing
designed to advise the public that an employer pays wages that are lower than union
wages, is lawful. Texas Distribs., Inc. v. Local Union No. 1005, 598 F.2d 393, 398
(5th Cir. 1982) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982)).
29. See J.T. DUNLOP & J. HEALY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PRINCIPLES AND
CASEs 53-68 (1953).
1430 [Vol. 29: p. 1421
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zations, are never a monolith. Attention to the conflicting interests
and internal governance for negotiations is essential to observe per-
ceptively agreement-making or to participate effectively in the pro-
cess. A great deal of the negotiations process is devoted subtly to
communications concerning internal priorities and reactions to vari-
ous proposals and counterproposals.
In the negotiations in 1975 over the five-year grain agreement
between the Soviet Union and the United States, for instance, there
were diverse interests within the United States. These diverse inter-
ests were concerned with the volume of grain to be sold in 1975 and
beyond, the urgency of reaching an accommodation, the conse-
quences on domestic living costs, how to resolve a longshoremen's
work stoppage and achieve the use of American tonnage in grain
shipments, and the need to include in the document an agreement
with the Soviets for oil purchases below the OPEC price. These di-
vergent interests were in part reflected in the different agencies of the
government. The Departments of State, Agriculture, Labor, Com-
merce, OMB and the White House, among others, were all involved
in making recommendations to the President on the positions in the
negotiations. Although the United States negotiators may have had
less hard information, it could be presumed there were some internal
differences to be accommodated at some levels within even the Soviet
government on questions of immediate needs, agricultural policies,
storage capacity, shipping rate structure and oil prices.30 In the end,
the United States had to abandon any linkage to oil if it was to
achieve an agreement and the Soviets were under pressure to reach a
negotiated settlement if it were to secure the grain volume it sought.
The grain agreement, and the related shipping agreement, required
considerable internal accommodation and congruent internal posi-
tions within each side-three agreements to achieve one formal
agreement.
The private collective bargaining process well illustrates the
same principle. The negotiating proposals of a labor organization are
ordinarily initially put together from the aspirations of a wide range
of members and subsidiary groups; the management proposals are no
different. The union comprises diverse interests. Younger workers
may be more interested in health care, older workers in pension bene-
fits and retired workers in adjusting pensions for increased living
30. R.B. PORTER, PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MAKING: THE ECONOMIC POLICY
BOARD 123-56 (1980). It appears that the Soviets were looking at other grain mar-
kets, and some Russian officials did not like the publicity that the purchases would
generate. Id. at 125 & n.3.
14311983-84]
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costs. Workers in various departments or plants may place high pri-
orities on local working conditions. Women or minorities may regard
as their top priority new elements in an affirmative action program.
Unemployed workers may be most concerned with supplemental un-
employment benefits and the extension of health care benefits. In
multi-company bargaining the marginal company employees may be
concerned with job security and employment compared with a high
priority for wage increases among higher profit companies, and so on.
The collective bargaining and negotiations process requires the labor
organization (and management) to assess these competing opportuni-
ties and to seek a settlement, before or after a work stoppage with a
"package" which is congruent with management's (the labor organi-
zation's) internal acceptances. The negotiation process eliminates
many of the initial aspirations of both sides and seeks mutually consis-
tent items and magnitudes-three agreements to achieve the agree-
ment ratified by the internal procedures of each party and made
public.
The diversity in management is evident most clearly in public
sector negotiations where mayors, city councils or boards of
selectmen, finance committees and personnel bodies may be at odds.
These differences are exacerbated by partisan and personality rival-
ries, and they materially complicate agreement-making and
ratification.3 l
The emphasis on the internal diversity and complexity of each
organization that is party to the negotiations suggests that each nego-
tiator appreciate the informal governance of each side in order to un-
derstand the proposals and counterproposals made in the
negotiations. It is vital to sense the priorities sought by each side, and
the severity of their opposition to proposals, in practice, rather than
merely in formal positions or in public pronouncements. Each nego-
tiator, and indeed mediator,32 needs to be sensitive to the possibilities
of putting together "packages" of items to constitute an acceptable
settlement in view of the respective priorities and negative evalua-
tions of particular proposals. Indeed, negotiations or mediation is
often the art of putting together packages that recognize the true pri-
orities on each side that will "sell" to both parties informally as well
31. SeeJ. BROCK, BARGAINING BEYOND IMPASSE: JOINT RESOLUTION OF PUB-
LIC SECTOR LABOR DISPUTES 144-49 (1982). Brock writes: "A personality conflict,
even if it has little to do with the issues at hand, can be damaging to the bargaining
relationship ... and thus impede settlement." Id. at 147.
32. See W.E. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING (1971).
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as in any formal ratification process. It takes three agreements to re-
solve the dispute.
B. The Initial Proposals
In negotiations the initial proposals for an agreement by any
party tend to be large or extreme relative to eventual settlement
terms, except in the case of a very few negotiators. It is important for
observers or negotiators to understand the reasons for such inflated
proposals and the functions that large initial proposals play in the
negotiations process. They should not be simply dismissed with
moral indignation as unreasonable; they often reveal a great deal
about the internal complex of the side making the proposals.
Many initial proposals are large because they reflect the way
they were put together, usually by simply assembling the aspirations
of the divergent groups which comprise each party to the negotia-
tions. In order to cut back or scale down proposals, it is essential to
establish priorities among groups within the negotiating organiza-
tions, as suggested in the first principle. While some culling of raw
proposals may be made initially, the process of priority setting and
scaling back proposals for one party or another is often an integral
part of the bargaining process itself.
Initial proposals may be extensive or large as a deliberate act on
the part of negotiators to secure the reactions of the other side. At the
outset it is not always clear which items or proposals may be of inter-
est or be most acceptable to the other side or elements of the other
side. A wide and diverse menu may permit explorations that other-
wise may not take place. Some proposals are also planted for future
years. John L. Lewis initially proposed the novel idea of royalty per
ton of coal mined for health care of miners as a means to compel the
diversified owners to study the approach seriously for the next
negotiations. 33
When negotiations may be protracted or when the environment
of the negotiations may be expected to change significantly, the initial
proposals may be large to accomodate such changed circumstances.
Parties are likely not to want to make proposals which may appear
grossly inadequate to their constituencies after six months or a year of
negotiations. Therefore, larger or more extreme initial proposals pro-
tect the negotiations from drastic changes in circumstances.
Initial proposals may be substantial to facilitate negotiations
33. See D.F. SELVIN, THE THUNDERING VOICE OF JOHN L. LEWIS 193-220
(1969) (outlining benefits achieved by Lewis as president of the UMW union).
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strategy calling for the abandonment or reduction in some items in
response to movement by the other party. If a negotiator has ad-
vanced only a minimum or final position, it will not be possible to
make concessions to see what effects such a change may have on the
other party. The need to maneuver in negotiations also encourages
large initial proposals.
It was observed above that there are a few situations in which
initial proposals for an agreement by a negotiator may be close to the
final settlement. Such a strategy may be followed, in my experience,
by a negotiator with very considerable authority and prestige so that
there is credibility, and when there likely is strong support for the
approach within the organization represented. The tactic has the ad-
vantage that once it has been successfully established in a previous
negotiation, it may contribute to its own success in future negotia-
tions. But the tactic has very limited applicability. The tactic of
take-it-or-leave-it from the beginning of negotiations is a dangerous
ploy for all but the strongest and most prescient. The process of nego-
tiating from large initial proposals to more reasonable ones is still the
ordinary course of negotiations.
C. The Art of Changing Positions
Negotiations constitute the process by which authorized repre-
sentatives from the different sides, starting from positions that are ini-
tially apart, often far apart, change their positions to seek to achieve a
procedural or substantive agreement. A procedural agreement would
settle a dispute, for instance, by referral to arbitration or to some
other tribunal for resolution.
The change in the formal position of a party in negotiations is
always accomplished with a certain amount of difficulty since a con-
cession may be interpreted as a weakness and invite expectations for
further yielding. Yet changes in positions by negotiators, ordinarily
substantial changes, are required if the differences between the parties
are to be narrowed and an agreement is to be achieved. But each
apparent concession tends to create on the other side the impression
of a willingness to yield further in continuing negotiations. If a nego-
tiator has reduced (or raised) his offer ten cents an hour, the other
side will argue that a further movement is appropriate to close the
remaining gap between the parties on that issue. Moreover, an ex-
plicit concession once made is almost impossible to withdraw as a
practical rather than as a formal or legal matter. It should be no
surprise that concessions from initial or previous proposals are often
accompanied by the refrain, "This is our last offer" or "This is our
1434 [Vol. 29: p. 1421
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last proposal" before some deadline or projected breakoff in
negotiations.
At the outset of negotiations, after the lists of formal proposals
have been submitted, each negotiator is likely to enjoy the full sup-
port of its organization, and there are sharp conflicts across the table.
The positions are far apart and each side has a united constituency on
rather extreme proposals. In the course of negotiations, as spokesmen
change their positions and make concessions, more and more tension
tends to arise within each group just as it may ease across the bargain-
ing table. As each initial proposal is dropped or modified, internal
support from additional constituencies may be lost. Indeed, it is a
practical rule-of-thumb that as one is nearing agreement across the
table, there is more difficulty within each side than between the lead-
ing spokesmen across the table. Each principal negotiator is often as
much preoccupied with handling the internal conflicts and shaping
proposals to satisfy the internal necessities as in handling controversy
with the opposing negotiator. Changing positions creates internal
tensions, making internal agreement more difficult.
The way in which negotiators for organizations change their po-
sitions in order to move toward a settlement is an art form involving
considerable style in handling tensions internally as well as across the
table. In my experience the characteristic which most distinctively
separates experienced from inexperienced negotiators is the way in
which they are able to effectuate changes in positions without creat-
ing expectations of further concessions and the way they can "read"
suggestions of the other side for possible changes in previous positions.
These differences in talents and skills do make a difference in the sub-
stantive outcomes of negotiations. A related element, absolutely es-
sential to the art of changing positions, is the capacity to listen
perceptively and to read between the lines. Timing or mutual under-
standing of the moods on the two sides is likewise critical to effective
negotiating.
In the early stages of negotiations, it would not be unusual for a
change in position to be reflected by the withdrawal or scratching of
some items from the agenda of one or both sides. But as the negotia-
tions proceed the discussions are often centered on various "packages"
of proposals. While a change in position may be reflected in a modifi-
cation in the magnitudes of the items in the "package," a change may
also be signaled by discussing a "package" modified to exclude some
items or to add some items more desirable to the other side. These
combinations may not be presented as formal offers or modifications
in positions but only as different "packages" for exploration. Only
14351983-841
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later may a formal change in position or a withdrawal of an item be
conceded.
There is often considerable ambiguity over the status of various
package proposals and their composition. At a given stage of the ne-
gotiations it may be quite uncertain what is in dispute and what, if
anything, has been agreed upon. This is due to an axiom of negotia-
tions providing that there is no agreement until all items in dispute
have been resolved one way or the other, unless otherwise explicitly
specified. The negotiations process ordinarily consists of steps involv-
ing changes in position, or indications of willingness to change, while
preserving positions should the negotiations fail to reach a settlement
in the current round or forum of negotiations.
Regardless of how artful or clumsy in execution, negotiations is
the process of changing positions in movement toward a resolution of
the dispute.
D. The Role of Deadlines
A deadline serves a vital function in negotiations. It compels
each side to reach decisions and establish priorities that would not
otherwise occur, at least not so rapidly. The temptation to procrasti-
nate and to hope the issue will go away or can be postponed is recur-
rent. In the absence of a deadline, as with a strike or a lockout in
collective bargaining, or in a court proceeding or other mandated de-
cision-making in government regulatory agencies, the negotiators or
mediators often create artificial deadlines to try to bring issues "to a
head" and to resolution.
The passage of time is not ordinarily neutral with respect to the
interests and fortunes of each party. Time may run more towards one
party than the other, and one or the other may hope for a more
favorable setting in which to settle or reach agreement. A deadline is
an institutional design in negotiations to reduce dilatory postpone-
ment. It could be a natural deadline, as in the expiration of an old
collective bargaining agreement, or a synthetic one, created by no less
a necessity than to catch an airplane or report to another scheduled
meeting.
The question is repeatedly asked as to why negotiations are not
settled until a deadline, often at midnight or in the wee hours of the
morning, even after a symbolic stopping of the clock. An apprecia-
tion of this distinctive feature of negotiations involves the series of
points made above concerning the essential nature of negotiations be-
tween continuing organizations. The "end game" of negotiations in-
volves concessions, from one side or the other or both, that are more
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vital than those changes in position previously made, and they are
likely to prove more difficult to make. The less valuable "chips" have
already been surrendered. Moreover, settlement involves complex
trade-offs, often in "principle," between one group of the constituency
and another as they involve different aspirations of the same constitu-
ency that is now required to face more realistically the opportunity
costs of any priority and what must be conceded to achieve the
objective.
These internal decisions involve complex communications.
Often there are sharp differences of internal views which are likely to
have become acute as negotiations have continued and more conces-
sions have been made. A deadline requires a reconsideration of the
easy view that the other side is likely to "blink" first, and it forces a
hard review of the consequences of nonagreement. These conse-
quences are more realistic when they are imminent than when viewed
in anticipation months ahead. A deadline is an essential ingredient to
such hard choices and decisions. Students well understand that it
often takes a deadline to produce a term paper.
E. The Ftnal Concession
The endplay of negotiations poses distinctive problems and op-
portunities that may facilitate agreement or freeze positions into ob-
durate obstacles to settlement. In the endstage of negotiations the
number of issues is reasonably limited and defined, and the distance
between the parties are moderate. The critical problem is that each
side would prefer the other to move to avoid a further concession it-
self; any move creates the serious enigma of creating the impression of
being willing to move all the way to the position of the other side.
The negotiating situation is delicate. As explained in the next sec-
tion, a mediator can play a vital role. In the absence of a neutral, it is
common for the one or two key persons from each side to meet pri-
vately at lunch or elsewhere, even without the advanced knowledge of
their colleagues, to span the remaining gap. The final steps are sel-
dom taken at the table, although they must be confirmed there and
by ratification.
Ronald Reagan, in his autobiography, reports on his experience
in negotiations as President of the Screen Actors Guild:
I was surprised to discover the important part a urinal
played in this high-altitude bargaining. When some point
has been kicked around, until it swells up bigger than the
whole contract, someone from one side or other goes to the
14371983-84]
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men's room. There is a kind of sensory perception that gives
you the urge to follow. . . . Then, standing side by side in
that room that levels king and commoner, comes an honest
question, "What do you guys really want?". . . Back in the
meeting, one or the other makes an offer based on this newly
acquired knowledge. . . . Then the other returnee from
the men's room says, "Can our group have a caucus?" That
is the magic word, like the "huddle" in football-it's where
the signal is passed.3 4
F. The Changing Site of Negotiations
An essential feature of all negotiations is the determination by
each negotiator at an early stage whether the other party is serious
about reaching an accommodation at the current "table" or whether
the parties are engaged in "going through the motions" to end in
some subsequent further negotiations in some other forum with some
other representatives, or whether the negotiations are a sham conceal-
ing a prospective conflict designed to end in the extinction of one
party. This judgment is often not easy to make, but it has decisive
effects upon the negotiations. There are many negotiations that are
perceived by both sides to be preliminary to further negotiations; as
long as both sides have the same perceptions, serious difficulties may
be avoided. Different expectations, however, can be the source of
major conflict and lead to charges of bad faith.
It is axiomatic that negotiations recognized to be preliminary to
a further stage are unlikely to elicit best offers. However, very impor-
tant functions relating to factual information, exploring priorities
among issues, alternative approaches, and sensing internal considera-
tions may be achieved.
In some labor-management negotiations it is possible to envisage
a succession of "tables" at which the dispute may be negotiated. Lo-
cal parties may be followed by national and headquarters representa-
tives of the two organizations; top officials may participate; a
succession of mediators and government officials may seek to mediate
the dispute; formal factfinding with recommendations may be volun-
tarily agreed upon or required by legislation; a succession of further
negotiations and mediation may follow factfinding; the physical lo-
cale of the negotiations may shift a number of times. The White
House or the governor may intervene in certain disputes. The negoti-
ators will want to anticipate such shifting "tables" because the timing
34. R. REAGAN & R.G. HUBLER, WHERE'S THE REST OF ME? 225 (1965).
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of concessions is vital to the negotiators, and mediators may expect
additional flexibility in positions.
Some negotiations, at least on the part of one side, may be re-
garded as a way to secure delay, to postpone legal proceedings, or to
secure a lapse of time thought to be favorable to one's position. In
such instances the procrastinating side is likely to pay scrupulous at-
tention to the form and protocol of negotiations but to avoid problem
solving. While it is vital for an observer or a participant to know
whether a case has these characteristics, the determination is often
not easy to make.
Among continuing organizations that deal with each other on an
ongoing basis, negotiations may at the outset take on the character of
mutual problem solving. The process involves careful development of
the factual basis of a problem, areas of agreement or disagreement
over the facts, including the need for further investigation. The iden-
tification of both the more objective character of the problem and the
organizational concerns for both parties are likely to be explored.
There follows an exploration of alternative resolutions of the prob-
lem, as redefined, and the costs and acceptability of each approach to
each party. An accomodation, formally or informally, may then be
accepted for a temporary or a longer period. In this mode negotia-
tions are problem solving; the negotiators are not characterized sim-
ply as traders seeking a sharp advantage. The difference is vital to
long term constructive relations between the organizations or groups.
G. The Use of Conflict
Negotiations do not preclude overt conflict, and both may take
place simultaneously. Thus, negotiations may begin or continue with
a strike or lockout, litigation, political activity, or while public cam-
paigns are also under way. It may be difficult for an organization to
conduct warfare and diplomacy simultaneously, but separate repre-
sentatives of an organization are often involved. In these circum-
stances, conflict is another form of pressure directed to the bargaining
table, and bargaining strategy may take on the form of another ele-
ment of conflict. It must, of course, be recognized that overt conflict,
in the circumstances of ongoing negotiations, may in the course of the
conflict, or as a consequence of the results of conflict, alter the posi-
tion of one side or the other in negotiations. Indeed, that is typically
the purpose of the conflict, to facilitate agreement on more favorable
terms or more rapidly.
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H. The Need for Secrecy
Negotiations are not fruitfully conducted in public, in the press
or in the media. Indeed, an indication that negotiators may be seri-
ous about reaching a settlement or be willing to explore their
problems in earnest is signaled when they exclude the press and re-
frain from press comment, save in the most general terms, such as,
"we met for so many hours" and "explored our mutual proposals con-
structively." In public sector bargaining, negotiations are ordinarily
excluded from the requirements of conducting public business under
the open meeting laws. It is important to be analytically clear as to
the reasons negotiations need to be conducted in private.
Negotiators desire to explain the concessions they make and the
terms they have achieved directly to their constituents rather than
have the press or media initially make that explanation and state the
merits, or deficiencies, of the settlement. The negotiators know their
own constituents and the political alignments within the group.
Moreover, the performance in negotiations and the appraisal of the
results of negotiations is a major feature of the political life of an or-
ganization that is decisive to the performance of leadership. Since
negotiations may treat different members of the group somewhat dif-
ferently, the leadership desires to deal with these differences directly
rather than have the media or press present an initial view.
The injection of the press into negotiations would make it even
more difficult for the principal negotiator, or the committee, to
change positions. The press reports would encourage those opposed
to generate hostility as the negotiations proceeded, before the settle-
ment can be considered as a whole. Moreover, as has been noted,
much of negotiations is contingent upon overall agreement, so that
initial proposals and counterproposals may not even appear in the
final settlement.
The proclivity of the press and media to highlight particular
items or give a special cast to events does not appear to serve well the
success of negotiations in process, particularly when an agreement is
subject to a ratification procedure. The public report of the settle-
ment, with any desired editorial comment after the fact, does not af-
fect the outcome.
I. An Essential Gap Filler
The negotiation process, ending in an agreement, typically needs
to provide for some procedure to administer or to interpret the terms
of the settlement. It is literally impossible to provide for all details,
1440 [Vol. 29: p. 1421
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circumstances or contingencies. Sometimes minor gaps are deliber-
ately left in an agreement since a full understanding cannot be
achieved, leaving the resolution to a future process of administration
or adjudication. Some questions can only be resolved in the light of
future developments. Specialists, or those subordinately involved in
particular operations, may be more appropriate to resolve the appli-
cation questions than the principals involved in the negotiations. The
long hours of tiring negotiations may overlook a problem, requiring a
subsequent procedure to resolve it.
In many instances the procedures for interpretation or adminis-
tration may simply constitute a reconvening of the negotiating com-
mittees or a subgroup. In other situations the procedures may involve
a separate group, including the possibility of resorting to arbitration
on a question of the meaning or application of the original agree-
ment. The parties may also agree on voluntary arbitration after a
period of future negotiations over the issues raised subsequent to the
agreement.
In a continuing relationship the process of interpretation and ad-
ministration of any agreement develops a substantial body of cases,
questions and answers, issues, interpretations and applications that
come to constitute, with the original negotiated agreement, a complex
and expanding body of common understandings. The terms of those
understandings may involve different levels of the organizations' par-
ties to the original agreement, from the top level to the lowest operat-
ing level in each. These processes provide the "flesh and blood" of
the interaction of the organizations, beyond the "bare bones" of the
formal agreement. In a sense, the negotiations process and the ad-
ministrative process create a complex interrelation of the organiza-
tions, on a day-to-day basis, and not merely the written words of the
formal agreement or protocol.
J. The Personaliy Factor
There is at least one facet of the negotiations process about
which it is most difficult to generalize in principle. This facet relates
to the importance of the personal relationships among the principal
negotiators. Agreements are made not merely among organizations
but also among individuals acting on behalf of these organizations.
Some individuals in these settings get along well and some do not.
This factor of personality, experience, skill, chemistry, attitude, de-
meanor, as well as status in the organization, does not tend to make
much difference in the agreement-making process in some situations,
while in others it matters very much. It is not unusual in negotiations
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for the chief negotiator of each side, sometimes with an aide, to meet
to talk "off-the-record" about procedures, timing or substance, or to
"try on for size" next moves or proposed settlements, and even to
compare notes on constituencies. Therefore, these personal relation-
ships may be pivotal. Even with respect to entirely professional nego-
tiators, the factor of personality influence is not inconsequential in
many cases.
While it may not be possible to adjudge its quantitative impact,
a careful observer of any negotiations or a mediator will want to ap-
praise and take into account the personality and the interaction of the
principal negotiators. The reference to this factor may not be analyti-
cally neat, but it does reflect a principle of practical import in many
instances.
In summary, the framework developed to elucidate negotiations
among continuing organizations that expect to continue to relate to
each other involves the following propositions:
1. It takes an agreement within each side to reach an agree-
ment across the table; in two-party negotiations, it takes three agree-
ments to make one.
2. Initial proposals in negotiations are typically large compared
to eventual settlements, to serve a variety of purposes. Priorities
within each side are often actually established in the course of
negotiations.
3. Negotiation is the process of changing positions and making
concessions from initial positions while moving toward an agreement.
4. A natural or artificial deadline is an essential feature of most
negotiations. Time is not neutral in its effects on the relative position
of the negotiators.
5. The end stages of negotiations are delicate, where issues are
limited and the distances apart may not be large. Private discussions
between one or two key persons on each side are often used to close
the gap in the absence of a mediator.
6. Negotiations will be significantly influenced by whether the
negotiating table is the final one or merely a step toward further ne-
gotiations, in new locales, with other higher-ranked negotiators or
with neutrals.
7. Negotiations and serious conflicts may be carried on simulta-
neously; the purpose of the overt conflict is typically to serve as a tool
of agreement-making, although the conflict, and its results, may affect
the bargaining objectives and priorities of the negotiators.
8. Agreement-making in negotiations does not flourish in pub-
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lic, with press and media coverage. Serious negotiations require that
the leaders at the table first communicate directly with their constitu-
ents concerning settlement and explain their recommendation, in
terms of the internal political life of the organization.
9. An agreement typically reflects the need for a recognized
procedure to resolve questions of the meaning and application of the
agreement or fill in lacunae.
10. The personality of negotiators and how they relate to each
other does affect the outcome in some instances.
IV. THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS
There is one further set of ideas that may give insight into inter-
preting negotiations from the perspective of the observer or the nego-
tiator. Ordinary negotiations tend to follow a pattern or course, and
it may be helpful to locate a given session or point in time in the
course of this succession of stages or life cycle. A number of stages
have been reflected in the above discussion.
The initial stage involves each side presenting its credentials, for
whom they speak and their authority to settle or to recommend settle-
ment. Each organization then formally presents its proposals for an
agreement, with supporting facts and argument.
The next stage involves each side in asking questions about the
proposals, seeking to understand how they would operate and in
probing the reasons for the proposals and searching for the true prior-
ity items for the current negotiations. Factual material may be devel-
oped and sidetables or subcommittees may be asked to generate data
on particular questions in dispute.
Some effort may next be made to narrow the number of issues or
the magnitudes involved. The next stage is likely to involve the at-
tempt to develop a package or alternative packages of proposals for a
settlement. This process involves a search for relative priorities and
trade-offs. The internal tensions within each side complicate this
process.
The endplay stage of negotiations, closing the gap, often involves
side-bar and private discussions of principal negotiators, or a media-
tor if one is involved. Seldom is agreement reached directly at the
negotiating table. There is typically considerable emotional release
on reaching agreement; there are joys of settlement.
An agreement needs to be reduced to "legal" language, to the
extent that has not been accomplished, and typically checked by both
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counsels. The appropriate ratification and approval processes also
need to be accomplished.
Not every day or night at the negotiating table is the same.
There is typically a beginning and an end and a sense of flow or a
process through stages toward an agreement. While there is often a
good deal of backing and hauling, and even starting over again, the
negotiators and close observers need a sense of location or stage in the
course of the negotiations process. 35
V. THE ROLE OF MEDIATION
The framework of the negotiation process among continuing or-
ganizations, summarized above, provides a setting to consider the
questions: What do mediators do to facilitate agreement making?
What are the potentials and the limitations of the mediator?
It has often been appropriately observed that there are various
types of mediation and mediators; the extent of penetration into the
substantive bargaining discourse, as well as the bargaining process,
varies a greal deal. Moreover, just as among negotiators, personality
factors and status may be significant factors with some mediators.
Some mediators may do little more than preside over meetings and
maintain a modicum of order, while others may be deeply involved in
proposing packages for settlement and in seeking acceptances of these
proposals. But whatever the role of a mediator in an individual situa-
tion, the concern, as with negotiations, is the analytics of the media-
tion process.
A. Controlling the Flow of Information
The strategic position of the mediator relates fundamentally to
the communication flow between the parties, and on occasion, de-
pending on location and time, the flow between the principal negotia-
tors and their larger committees and constituencies. Particularly in
35. The discussions of negotiations and mediation in this article has significant
implications for public policy. The NLRB and the courts have created the concept
of "impasse" in negotiations, and public sector agencies in various states have fol-
lowed their lead. An employer may be free to make unilateral changes in working
conditions, withdraw from an association, or take similar action if an "impasse" ex-
ists. This is an utterly unsatisfactory and ambiguous standard. The parties may not
be able to settle the dispute directly; with one mediator they may but not with an-
other; the dispute may remain one night but be settled in a further week; an "im-
passe" may be largely in the eye of the beholder. Or, it may be an excuse to destroy
the other side. As a mediator, I am unwilling to recognize or to announce a perma-
nent "impasse." For a discussion of the law, see C.J. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT 330-32 (1971).
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mediation in which the parties are separated, and the parties meet
separately with the mediator (which is true at the most critical stages
of most negotiations with mediation), the control over information
flow between the parties is in the hands of the mediator.
This is a substantial and significant tool. What the parties know
of each other's changing positions, the explanation and rationales for
changes, any view as to how far apart the parties may truly be, the
status of internal conflicts of view, and critical attitudes and feelings
all are within the control of the mediator. An encouraging or dismal
picture may be portrayed by the mediator to each party. The way in
which this "switch" in the control over information is utilized is the
first principle in understanding the function of mediation in negotia-
tions. The parties might have transmitted to each other some of the
information available to the mediator were they meeting across the
table. But the mediator alone is privy to some information as a conse-
quence of private discussions with each side, due to the confidence
and trust with each side.
In the event the parties communicate directly with each other,
around the mediator, a signal has been given as to the mediator's
limited usefulness, probably restricting the role to housekeeping
functions.
B. Impartial Facfinders
The mediator function often involves the development of mutu-
ally acceptable factual data to provide a setting for the more in-
formed and more dispassionate discussion of particular issues. In
some cases the costing of various proposals and the validation of data
regarding other settlements or levels of wages and benefits may be
significant to settlement. The costing of complex pension plans or
health care arrangements may be done with the mediator or with
agreed-upon outside experts. It is difficult to exaggerate the impor-
tance and effectiveness, as a mediation tool, of working through back-
ground factual material with the parties in a dispassionate mode.
C. Engendering Understanding
The mediator serves privately as an informal advisor to each side
in the delicate art of putting together packages for consideration by
the other. This role involves a sensitivity to the internal priorities and
constituencies of each party. It also includes a sympathetic interpre-
tation of each side to the other as to its problems and aspirations.
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D. The Neutral Proponent
The mediator has the opportunity to formulate a distinctive and
imaginative package proposal on his own out of an independent and
creative perspective. The mediator is free to try on ideas without hav-
ing to commit to either party as to where the ideas originated. The
parties may have so pursued particular solutions of course that they
have neglected new or original ideas that might more acceptably re-
solve their differences. Mediators differ greatly in their willingness to
take such initiatives, although the most distinguished in the past gen-
eration, such as George Taylor or David L. Cole, were never bashful
in this respect if the option appeared to offer an alternative for
settlement.
E. Fnalzztmg Agreement
The mediator has a special opportunity in the "endgame" of ne-
gotiations. When the parties are relatively close to settlement, and
they are aware of it, the final steps may be very difficult. Each side
may well believe the other should make the final concessions. The
dispute may appear particularly intractable at this juncture; each
side has made many moves that have hurt and the internal hostility
to a further accommodation is likely to be very high. In these circum-
stances a third party may greatly facilitate agreement. The separate
conditional acceptance to the mediator by one side of a proposal does
not prejudice the position of that side if there is no agreement. It is
not unusual for a mediator to secure the separate acceptance of each
side to a "package" of the mediator's design and then to bring the
parties together to announce that, even if they do not know it, they
have an agreement.
F. The Importance of Mutual Respect
A critical factor affecting the role of the mediator is the circum-
stances by which he or she entered the dispute. In general, the strong-
est possible position derives from a joint invitation of the parties to
the mediator to assist in the resolution of the controversy. The past
relationship of the parties with the mediator, if any, is also likely to be
a factor. A mediator may have so sought to induce agreement in a
previous case as to be unacceptable to either one or both parties in
another situation.
G. Potential Arbitrator
A mediator may be asked to serve as an arbitrator, with author-
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ity to determine a settlement on one or more specified issues. While
arbitration is a different proceeding, and bears a different relationship
to negotiations than mediation, there is a class of arbitrations which
involve the mediator in formally decreeing an agreed-upon settlement
which the parties for one reason or another desire to be formally spec-
ified as an arbitration award. The arbitration format of a settlement
may be more acceptable to certain internal constituencies or external
groups.
H. The Public Perspective
Finally, some mediators may play a role in settlement of some
disputes by asserting a moral author4y or position for the public in-
terest that they may seek to represent or to project. This role may be
supported by public officials, by the press, or by interests among af-
fected businesses or communities. In some limited circumstances this
role may help to induce settlement, although rarely has this factor
alone been very effective.
In summary, in the negotiations process among established orga-
nizations as analyzed earlier, mediations may play an independent
role in achieving settlement. The analytical process of mediation
achieves its outcome through the following processes:
1. Control of the communication patterns among the
parties and the use of these flows to encourage settlement.
2. The dispassionate development of factual material
thought to be relevant to the issues in negotiations.
3. Assisting the parties in developing settlement pack-
age proposals.
4. Developing distinctive settlement packages differ-
ent from those initiated by the parties.
5. Facilitating settlement without prejudicing the po-
sition of the parties when further movement is required dur-
ing the "end game" of negotiations.
6. The role of the mediator is significantly influenced
by the circumstances and sponsorship under which the neu-
tral entered the dispute.
7. The mediator may facilitate acceptance of a settle-
ment, on occasion, by issuing an arbitration award.
8. A mediator may, on rare occasion, be in a position
to exert a moral authority or reflect a public interest in the
resolution of a dispute.
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
As a means for the resolution of conflict between organizations,
negotiations and agreement-making have a variety of advantages
compared to litigation, governmental fiat, or warfare to extinction,
although there are some agreements that may be unacceptable to the
society expressed in its political and legal processes. The significant
feature of an agreement is that its parties are committed to live by it
rather than to continue conflict and warfare after a decision unac-
ceptable to one side. There is simply no decision so precise or detailed
that parties cannot continue to fight about its meaning, application
and scope if they choose to do so. There is an important sense in
which no decision among groups can genuinely resolve a controversy
unless the parties agree to accept it. The likelihood of parties enforc-
ing their own agreement is far greater than their accepting a decision
adverse to one party.
Beyond the basic superiority of genuinely settling a controversy,
if agreement is achieved, negotiations have the virtue that they may
reduce the high costs to the parties of litigation, the time required for
a resolution, and the uncertainty of the resolution. Further, the two
sides are ordinarily capable of more imaginative solutions to
problems than any outsiders, since they presumably know more about
their problems and controversies than do others. It is also the case
that many of the conflicts among groups are so complex, or groups
are so powerful relative to each other, that increasingly issues cannot
be decided with a winner and a loser. The negotiations process often
discovers a viable form of accommodation not previously evident.
Negotiations can be creative and problem-solving, while most litiga-
tion tends to be formalistic and sterile.
These observations suggest that an understanding of the general
principles of negotiations and some rudimentary skills are an essential
feature of the education for managers of public, nonprofit and busi-
ness organizations alike. The emphasis that is placed in education on
an appreciation of markets and governmental processes including liti-
gation, for practitioners and officers alike, needs to be shifted to some
degree toward negotiations and agreement-making, since they play a
growing role in conflict resolution today, and they are likely to be
even more significant in the future of organizations. 36
36. The substance of this article appears in Mr. Dunlop's new volume, J.T.
DUNLOP, DISPUTE RESOLUTION, NEGOTIATION AND CONSENSUS BUILDING 3-28
(1984).
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